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Abstract The life-science community is a key stakeholder
in the effort to ensure that the advances in biotechnology
are not misused. Unfortunately, to date, the engagement of
life scientists with issues of biosecurity has been limited.
Microorganisms have been harnessed for the benefit of
humankind but in the wrong hands could be used in direct
or indirect acts against humans, livestock, crops, food,
water infrastructure and other economically valuable enti-
ties. The Microbial Resources Research Infrastructure in its
preparatory phase has addressed the topic implementing a
code of conduct as part of its programme of prevention of
malicious use and continues to work with the international
community to raise awareness of best practice to avoid
misuse of microorganisms. Biosecurity has become a major
concern for several countries creating numerous activities
to put in place counter measures, risk assessment, legisla-
tion and emergency response. The goal is to implement
measures to protect us against malicious use of microor-
ganisms, their products, information and technology
transfer. Through this paper, we wish to discuss some of
the activities that are underway, mention key educational
tools and provide scientists with information on addressing
biosecurity issues.
Keywords Biorisk  Biosecurity  Biological resource
centre  Code of conduct  Microbial resources research
infrastructure  Microorganisms
Introduction
Microorganisms are a vital component of the world’s
biodiversity. They are involved in nutrient recycling (e.g.
breaking down complex plant and animal remains), bene-
ficial mutualistic relationships (e.g. nitrogen fixation, ani-
mal digestion, mycorrhiza) and production of atmospheric
oxygen. Moreover, they are pathogens of pests and disease-
causing organisms and, hence, may be harnessed by man
for the biological control of pests in integrated pest man-
agement programmes. Their other uses include production
of natural products (e.g. valuable drugs, enzymes and
metabolites) for pharmaceutical, food and other applica-
tions, composting, bioremediation and detoxification of
wastes. They play a major role in soil fertility and plant and
animal health and are employed in diagnostics, efficacy
testing of drugs, biocides, vaccine production and disin-
fectants or as reference strains. Harnessed correctly they
can provide solutions to the sustainable development goals,
for example making contributions to alleviation of poverty
and hunger, sources of energy and in the improvement of
health.
Worldwide, there are thousands of organisations of
varying sizes that handle microorganisms. These organi-
sations range from medical centres, universities and
research institutes, veterinary diagnostic laboratories,
phytopathology facilities, research and development facil-
ities of in vitro diagnostic, vaccine manufacturers and their
production plants to comprehensive biological resource
centres. All of these organisations are requested to manage
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the associated biorisks, which includes mitigating the risk
of an intentional misuse or unintentional release of a
microorganism from a facility that may result in deleterious
impact to human health, the environment and/or the
economy. Additionally, the public face of microbiology is
tainted by the ability of some to cause deterioration, death
and destruction. Forgotten is Fleming’s penicillin producer
or the immunosuppressant cyclosporin and replaced by the
thought of potential misuse. Are they our friends or our
foes? Certainly the results of microbiological research tell
us that we are making tremendous advances in knowledge
and our ability to harness the potential of microorganisms.
Microbiologists need to be aware of the needs of biose-
curity in order to ensure our security from misuse while
continuing the discovery path towards the next antimicro-
bial against the ever increasing resistant disease-causing
organisms.
Many countries, including many developing economies,
lack national regulations that establish requirements for
managing biorisks. Biosecurity has become a major con-
cern for several countries creating numerous activities to
put in place counter measures, risk assessment, legislation
and emergency response. The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Best Practice
Guidelines offers a definition for ‘biosecurity’ in the con-
text of a Biological Resource Centres (BRCs) which states
that it is institutional and personal security measures and
procedures designed to prevent the loss, theft, misuse,
diversion or intentional release of pathogens, or parts of
them, and toxin-producing organisms, as well as such
toxins that are held, transferred and/or supplied by BRCs
[15]. In this guidance document, BRCs distinguish between
biosecurity and biosafety measures. Biosafety entails the
use of containment principles, technologies and practices
that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to
pathogens and toxins, or their accidental release. Whereas
biosecurity is intended to deter or detect the loss or theft of
dangerous biological materials for illicit or malicious
purposes, the biosecurity best practice guidelines focus on
preventing unauthorised access to dangerous biological
materials in BRCs. They are not intended to address
biosecurity in other types of facilities, nor do they address
specific measures related to crisis management in the event
of a security breach. Although designed for BRCs, the
principles of this guidance hold true for anyone holding,
handling, utilising and sharing microorganisms.
The microbial domain Biological Resource Centres
(mBRCs) have being taking action using the OECD best
practice described above as a basis and have developed a
code of conduct to help create a safe environment and
facilitate research [19] http://ijs.sgmjournals.org/content/
63/Pt_7/2374.long. The Microbial Resources Research
Infrastructure (MIRRI) on the European Strategy Forum
for Research Infrastructures (ESFRI) road map has taken
up the challenge to ensure best practice (www.mirri.org).
MIRRI is a pan-European distributed research infrastruc-
ture that provides facilitated access to high-quality
microorganisms, their derivatives, associated data and
services for research, development and application. In
December 2014, it brought together the collections com-
munity with groups representing governments and policy
makers, training and education, standards and regulation
authorities and the bioscience and bioindustry communities
to raise awareness and help put in place practical solutions.
MIRRI through its partners is participating in International
Standards Organisation (ISO) Technical Committee 276
Biotechnology, designing a set of standards for biotech-
nology impacting on the provision and use of living
materials from biobanks (http://www.iso.org/iso/home/
standards_development/list_of_iso_technical_committees/
iso_technical_committee.htm?commid=4514241). The
additional participation in working group 5 ‘Laboratory
biorisk management’ of ISO/TC 212 complements the
efforts of MIRRI in the development of essential but yet
missing global standards in the field of biobanking.
Keeping abreast of such initiatives is essential not only for
mBRCs but for the microbiology community in general [9].
At the highest level, e.g. governmental, the goal is to
implement measures to protect us against malicious use of
microorganisms, their products, information and technol-
ogy transfer. Terrorists and ill-meaning individuals from
inside and outside of the aforementioned organisations
could use them in direct or indirect acts against humans,
livestock, crops, food, water infrastructure and other eco-
nomically valuable entities. The threat of someone
acquiring a human pathogen for mal-intent is real but to
date there is no common agreement of the level of risk,
reflecting the likelihood of this happening, and no har-
monised system for reporting of adverse incidents. Despite
this, such issues impact upon microbiology and its expo-
nents. Keeping abreast of developing issues and the
resultant implemented measures that impact upon micro-
biologist’s daily activities is becoming more difficult.
Biotechnology applications continue to grow at a rapid
pace, particularly in developing countries. Technical
capabilities that were previously concentrated in highly
developed countries are increasingly being employed more
broadly around the world. In the field of microbial resource
collections, the World Federation for Culture Collections
(WFCC), who list over 700 culture collections in the World
Data Centre for Microorganisms (WDCM—www.wdcm.
org) with over 6000 staff around the world helps its
members by participating in relevant international initia-
tives on biosecurity (www.wfcc.info).
Microbiologists need to have a reliable source of
authoritative information. Of course the national authority
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provides the correct in-country information but finding it is
not always easy and as regulations and national oversight
vary from country to country, the requirements of other
countries are not readily available. Although over time, the
affected communities have made great strides in under-
standing and controlling risks occurring from handling
microorganisms, these improvements have not been
applied consistently or evenly at the regional and global
level. The Microbial Resources Research Infrastructure
(MIRRI—http://www.mirri.org/home.html) has been
working with other stakeholders on this topic and endorses
the code of conduct on biosecurity for Biological Resource
Centres [19]. MIRRI considers that awareness raising and
education are basic requirements to ensure the safe use of
microorganisms, more than ever in the absence of stan-
dardised and harmonised systems and regulation. A wealth
of information is available which can be accessed through
several sources; a starting point can be through the OECD-
specific website on biosecurity issues (http://www.biose
curity.org). There are several educational tools and courses
available for example through the University of Bradford,
which has published authoritative books on biological
security education addressing undergraduates in life-sci-
ence courses as well as team-learning-based education
handbooks on biological security (see http://www.bradford.
ac.uk/social-sciences/peace-studies/research/publications-and-
projects/guide-to-biological-security-issues/). Rappert and
McLeish [17] published the work A Web of Prevention:
Biological Weapons, Life Sciences and the Governance of
Research addressing life-science research and its implica-
tions for security. It provides an insight into current dis-
cussion on effective preventive measures and effective
control measures. There are several web-based tools
including new security learning at http://www.news
ecuritylearning.com/index.php/archive/78-building-capa
city-in-dual-use-bioethics-biosecurity-education-for-life-sci
entists which provides technology-assisted training for
security and defence and emergency services. Other sites
are aimed at researchers and practitioners such as those
through Bradford University http://www.bradford.ac.uk/
research/sustainable-societies/impact/global-biosecurity/.
The following describes the issue of biosecurity, introduces
some of the actors and their roles and highlights best practices
to reduce the potential for misuse of microorganisms.
Addressing Biosecurity at the International Level
Eighty years ago, the Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of
the use of biological and chemical weapons in war was
drawn up. In 1969, the way was paved for the Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). The BTWC
forms the baseline agreement that lays down the key
principles internationally on disarmament and proliferation
control measures. It came into force in its current structure
over thirty years ago, on 26 March 1975; 174 countries are
States Parties to it. In 2001, following the 9/11 attacks and
the Amerithrax the picture changed completely and the
term biosecurity evolved, drawing attention to the potential
of modern biotechnology to be exploited for malicious
ends [5]. A ‘code of conduct’ for scientists (‘professional
ethics’) was requested at different levels, e.g. during Aus-
tralia Group meetings it was regarded necessary to protect
the biological weapons control and prevent further possible
erosion. It was considered that more effective control
mechanisms, data protection and better information on
relevant documentation and tracking were required. The
Australia Group came into existence in the 1980 s, has
grown to include 34 members and encourages countries to
impose export measures for control of dual-use goods. This
globally important initiative has many outreach activities.
It is an informal group of countries committed to com-
bating the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons
providing the international community with lists of
potential dual-use materials (microorganisms) that need to
have controlled access for legitimate use.
The European Union brought in regulations, firstly
addressing biosafety through containment dependent on
hazard with the aim of reducing health risks associated
with microorganisms; the Control of Biological Agents -
Health and Safety EC Directive 2000/54/EEC on Biologi-
cal Agents http://eur-op.eu.int/opnews/395/en/r3633.html.
More specifically regarding biosecurity, the EU Council
Regulation 3381/94/EEC on the Control of Exports of
Dual-Use Goods from the Community http://eur-op.eu.int/
opnews/395/en/r3633.html was introduced to control
access to organisms that could be misused. At the time, the
culture collection community in Europe initiated activities
to raise awareness of these issues and improve practices to
address the regulations and the need to control access to
legitimate uses. In particular, the European Commission
funded project European Biological Resource Centres
Network (EBRCN) issued information resource documents
now available via the WFCC website www.wfcc.info.
The Inter-Academy Panel on International Issues (IAP),
the International Council for Science (ICSU) and The
National Academies of the United States International
Forum on Biosecurity met 20–22 March 2005 in Como,
Italy. The discussion reflected concern over the growing
awareness that rapid developments in the life sciences and
biomedical research, while offering great benefits, also
pose the risk that the knowledge, tools and techniques that
enable these advances might be misused to cause deliberate
harm. Any effort to address this ‘dual-use’ dilemma must
ultimately be international, since biotechnology research is
a genuinely global enterprise. The scientific community has
an essential role in ensuring that efforts to manage the risks
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do so in a way that fosters both improved security and
strengthened international collaboration to ensure scientific
advances.
The Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
(CBACI) and the International Institute for Strategic
Studies—USA (IISS-USA) conducted a joint project to
promote the engagement of the global biotechnology
industry in issues of public safety and security with special
attention to biological weapons and bioterrorism. The
CBACI is a policy research organisation established in
1993 to address the challenges to global security and sta-
bility with a special, but not exclusive focus on the elim-
ination of chemical weapons and biological weapon. The
IISS promotes the development of sound policies that
further global peace and security and maintain ‘civilised’
international relations. The project has resulted in the
creation of the International Council for the Life Sciences
(http://www.embo.org/scisoc/icls_charter.pdf), a global
organisation of biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms
and other entities to establish a self-sustaining enterprise
that provides a mechanism for private industry to con-
tribute to improved quality of life and to enhance inter-
national standards of public safety and security on a global
scale through responsible, ethical and sound business and
scientific practices and to facilitate the development of
effective partnerships between the life-sciences industry,
government, international organisations, the scientific
community and other critical constituencies on these vital
issues of common concern. Their discussions have raised
some important views:
• Biological, Chemical and Nuclear dangers are huge.
• Terror groups can process biological agents for misuse.
• Governments cannot address issues alone and need
international collaboration.
• The outcome of the event of an attack will depend on
preparedness.
• Impacts of biological, chemical and nuclear dangers
extend beyond humans and include animals, plants and
the environment.
• All microbiologists must follow best practice to keep
pathogens out of the hands of those who may misuse
them.
• Scientists must not sit back and wait for an event that
will stimulate reaction, and there is a need to be
proactive in prevention and preparedness.
• Health security will depend upon public/private
cooperation.
A key issue is the capability and intent for bioterrorism.
There might be a shortening in timelines between the idea,
intent and potential to actual capacity and ability to carry
out a bioterrorist act, fuelled by the availability of tools,
technology and information. A charter to be adopted by the
biotechnology companies, organisations and other pro-
ducers and suppliers has been published on the Interna-
tional Council for the Life Sciences (ICLS) website, and
interested parties are invited to participate (http://www.icl
scharter.org/).
While in most high consequence industries (e.g. nuclear
industry, airline industry, extracting and chemical indus-
tries) proactive risk management has been widely imple-
mented, there is a need for a universally accepted system
for biorisk management in life sciences including good
mechanisms to provide appropriate risk communication.
The microbiologist community should consider adopting
the self-conception of their scientific work as being part of
such a high consequence community. This basic under-
standing is living awareness and being aware that the
bioterrorism threat is something that microbiologists must
address and effectively deal with alongside a number of
similar issues that require similar controls, e.g. compliance
with national legislation and international conventions,
handling of emerging diseases, health and safety, access to
genetic resources and security. Bioterrorism can impact on
the way microbiology is undertaken but it mustn’t impede
its progress. It is therefore essential that measures to reduce
such impact are embedded in normal operational practice
as far as is possible. Biorisk assessment needs to be carried
out for several reasons for health and safety, for transport
regulation and to identify dual-use organisms, the assess-
ment should indicate what needs to be implemented for
each microorganism handled. The OECD guidance for
BRC attempts to do this but relies upon resources such as
the World Health Organisation’s Laboratory Biosafety
Manual third edition [23]. This provides a key source for
biosafety support and information to practitioners in
microbiology. The WHO has also produced biorisk man-
agement, laboratory biosecurity guidance [24] which helps
BRCs understand their responsibilities in risk assessment.
Above this operational level best practice scientific soci-
eties and organisations such as the International Union of
Microbiological Societies [8] and the European Culture
Collections’ Organisation [18] have endorsed codes of
ethics or conduct to raise awareness and to introduce safe
practices.
The OECD Biological Resource Centre (BRC) initiative
drafted guidance to deliver a practical approach that
enables legitimate research and development but reduces
the opportunity for misuse. The OECD Biological
Resource Centre (BRC) Biosecurity Guidance was pub-
lished in 2007 [15] which left some questions still to be
answered around biorisk assessment. There are a defined
number of human pathogens but even here an agreed
international list of organisms is difficult to achieve. The
organisms of biosecurity concern extend beyond the human
pathogens to include crop and animal pathogens and those
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that can be used to threaten environmental and economic
targets. The OECD BRC Task Force agreed that guidance
was necessary but that it should not be bureaucratic and
applied to situations that don’t require it. The basic prin-
ciples of the guidance are that BRCs should:
• Be accredited/certified to handle organisms to a specific
hazard level.
• Comply with legislation over national boundaries.
• Not increase the hazard level of the organisms they
hold.
• Enable full traceability of distribution—i.e. the require-
ment for MTAs material transfer agreements and end-
user certificates.
It would therefore follow that only approved BRCs
could hold agents of concern and that exchanges across
national boundaries would be between BRCs of equal
clearance. The OECD provides information that extends
beyond the BRC community and has created a web-based
information resource (http://www.biosecurity.org).
There is an argument that the threat is mostly economic,
the target may not be human. In the light of what happened
in Asia with SARS and bird-flu, the consequence of a
disease outbreak (human, animal or plant disease), whether
occurring naturally or with intended or involuntary human
intervention, is serious injury, economic loss, productivity
loss and even death. As national controls are put in place
through national legislation, for example the Patriot Act in
the USA and Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 in
the UK, the lists of organisms of concern differ. The effect
of human pathogens is global, but this is not the case for
crop pathogens and what might be a threat in one country
will not be in another. In a spectrum of risk, spanning
natural events, from emerging disease through man’s
intervention, e.g. from laboratory accidents to deliberate
acts, to bioterrorism, the greatest risk comes from emerging
disease. There are several groups working on risk assess-
ment, and publications are available on these issues, e.g.
Hood et al [6] The Government of Risk: Understanding
Risk Regulation Regimes. It was considered by participants
of the MIRRI workshop ‘biosecurity implementation
strategies and compliance management in mBRCs’, 1–3
December 2014, that the number of organisms is small and
the likelihood of an event rare but a biorisk assessment
carried out should indicate the organisms of concern, in
which circumstances and consequently the precautions that
need to be taken. The authors believe that such require-
ments be built into normal operations of the laboratory and
become routine. MIRRI assists in introducing an environ-
ment of compliance and helping its partners by developing
best practices.
In the light of increasing control of access to microor-
ganisms and their safe handling by national and international
laws, regulation, best practice and international standards,
microbiologists need to be able to select the most appropriate
tools for their specific use. Facilitating compliance and a safe
system for access and distribution of microorganisms does
not restrict legitimate use and shall always follow a principle
of appropriateness, which does not demand the same rules for
materials that present little risk.
Role of Training and Education in Raising
Awareness of the Need for Legal Compliance
and Implementing Best Practice
The life-science community is a key stakeholder in the
effort to ensure that the advances in biotechnology are not
misused for hostile purposes. Unfortunately, to date, the
engagement of life scientists with issues of biosecurity has
been limited [1]. The ongoing debate on the risks and
benefits of gain-of-function research is a notable exception
in this regard. Generally, studies and surveys carried out
over the past decade have demonstrated that the level of
awareness of biosecurity among life scientists is low. This
is hardly surprising, since biosecurity issues seldom feature
in the formal life-science curricula [10].
Measures for promoting biosecurity awareness in the
life sciences have been the subject of discussion within the
framework of the BTWC for a number of years now. Codes
of conduct and training programmes were among the topics
under consideration among States Parties to the Conven-
tion during the 2007–2010 Inter-Sessional Process [2]. The
Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC held in
December 2011 agreed on the value of national imple-
mentation measures to:
1. implement voluntary management standards on bio-
safety and biosecurity;
2. encourage the consideration of development of appro-
priate arrangements to promote awareness among
relevant professionals in the private and public sectors
and throughout relevant scientific and administrative
activities;
3. promote among those working in the biological
sciences awareness of the obligations of States Parties
under the Convention, as well as relevant national
legislation and guidelines;
4. promote the development of training and education
programmes for those granted access to biological
agents and toxins relevant to the Convention and for
those with the knowledge or capacity to modify such
agents and toxins;
5. encourage the promotion of a culture of responsibility
among relevant national professionals and the volun-
tary development, adoption and promulgation of codes
of conduct [3].
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Relevant projects, initiatives and proposals have been
presented and put forward both during the formal deliber-
ations of States Parties and during side events and panel
discussions held on the margins of the BTWC Meetings
[16].
The need for fostering biosecurity awareness among the
life-science community has further been underscored in
numerous authoritative high-level reports, which have
identified it as one of their key recommendations. Some
notable examples include:
• Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism (Fink
Committee Report), US National Research Council,
2004 [12];
• Globalisation, Biosecurity and the Future of Life
Sciences (Lemon-Relman Committee Report), US
National Research Council, 2006 [13];
• Brainwaves Module 3: Neuroscience, Conflict and
Security, UK Royal Society, 2012 [21];
• Improving Biosecurity: Assessment of Dual-Use
Research, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 2013 [20];
• Biosecurity—Freedom and Responsibility of Research,
German Ethics Council, 2014 [4].
Some progress has already been made in the area of
content development for biosecurity education and training
programmes. The work carried out by the Biosecurity
Working Group of the Inter-Academy Panel (IAP)—The
Global Network of Science Academies, US National
Academies of Sciences (US NAS) and University of
Bradford, UK, is indicative in this regard. In 2005, the IAP
published a Statement on Biosecurity which outlined a set
of fundamental principles that could serve as a basis for the
development of codes of conduct [7]. At the time when the
Statement was issued, codes of conduct were among the
key tools considered as a means of raising awareness of the
BTWC and the broader social, legal and ethical implica-
tions of novel life-science advances. The US NAS have
completed a number of projects focusing on building
capacity in the area of responsible science. Through the
implementation of institutes across the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) and the South-East Asia regions, US
NAS have successfully empowered faculty members spe-
cialising in the life sciences with knowledge and skills that
can help embed responsible science education at a local
level [14]. For its part, the University of Bradford has
worked on a number of projects aimed at developing
biosecurity training content, with the most recent initiative
encompassing the production of a twofold online educa-
tional resource (www.bradford.ac.uk/research/sustainable-
societies/impact/global-biosecurity/). The resource com-
prises a Guide to Biological Security Issues titled
Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do [22]. Its
twenty-one chapters provide a detailed overview of the
security challenges arising from the rapid progress of
biotechnology; the international biological prohibition
regime aimed to ensure that the life sciences are utilised
only for peaceful, prophylactic and protective purposes; the
role that different stakeholders, such as scientific organi-
sations, industry, the law enforcement community and
governments can play in the implementation of biosecurity.
The Guide further highlights the significance of applying
active learning methods when teaching biosecurity. The
book builds on the wealth of experience of the authors and
is intended to raise awareness and knowledge of biological
security of everyone active in the life sciences including
those engaged in research to those engaged in management
and policy-making at both the national and international
levels. In order to facilitate the dissemination of training
content, the Guide is accompanied by a manual, Biological
Security Education Handbook: The Power of Team-Based
Learning [11]. The Handbook seeks to assist lecturers and
trainers with the development of biosecurity courses and
seminars using a cutting-edge active learning approach—
Team-Based Learning. The format has been specifically
selected, not least because of its user-friendly structure and
proven efficiency and effectiveness for various purposes in
different educational settings. Both books are freely
available online and are currently being translated in
Arabic, Russian and Ukrainian.
A crucial factor that is likely to have far-reaching
implications for the demand of biosecurity education and
training is the growing attention to the articulation and
introduction of professional competence standards for life-
science practitioners. In 2015 the International Federation
of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) launched an international
certification programme which is intended to fulfil IFBA’s




fessionals). Among the relevant qualifications that life-sci-
ence professionals can take, one is exclusively focused on
biosecurity, covering a broad spectre of issues related to
international regulations and guidelines; risk assessment;
personnel reliability; physical biosecurity measures;
pathogen accountability; and dual use and bioethics (http://
www.internationalbiosafety.org/index.php/professional-certifi
cation/professional-certification/studying).
While biosecurity awareness is certainly an essential
condition for minimising the risks of the hostile misuse of
the life sciences, it is important to note that it is neither a
sufficient measure, nor a ‘silver bullet’. Rather, it needs to
be considered and promoted as part of a broader complex
of relevant policies and mechanisms, designed to foster a
robust biosecurity culture, and thus sustain an integrated
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and comprehensive web of preventive measures which
discourages the misuse of microorganisms for hostile
purposes.
MIRRI’s Approach to Compliance
and the Introduction of Safe Practices
To develop safe practices beyond awareness raising MIRRI
has adopted the OECD best Practices on Biosecurity for
BRCs (OECD 2007) and the code of conduct for mBRCs
[19]. These will be implemented through its Partner Charter
when the legal entity for MIRRI is established. A Policy
statement on Biorisk assessment in Biological Resource
Centres and implementation of biosecurity measures was
submitted to the European Commission as part of its
preparatory phase European Union’s Seventh Framework
Programme project output. This was based on the analysis
of the results obtained from a biosecurity questionnaire and
risk assessment trials carried out with partners spanning 11
European Union countries. In addition, MIRRI organised a
workshop on biosecurity implementation strategies and
compliance management in mBRCs, 1–3 December 2014.
Participants represented industry, academia, experts in
biosecurity, policy makers and microbiologists including
those from mBRCs. There were a number of issues identi-
fied; to resolve these it was recommended that a general task
force focussing on the implementation and impact of all
relevant guidance documents should be set up. In addition a
consensus view on how these might be implemented is
required. There were several other issues and concerns
raised through the biosecurity survey questionnaire that
need resolution. Education and training were considered to
play a crucial role in the implementation of biosecurity
demands; this should include curricula modules for acade-
mia/ universities as well as being an element in continued
professional development. Establishing defined pro-
grammes for this was desirable while taking advantage of
the existing programmes such as the Bradford training
programme which provides a very intensively elaborated
approach to the topic. It was clear that all participants
supported increased communication between institutions
and between mBRCs in particular. Participants learned that
the Dutch Government had taken the lead in providing its
scientists with support in biosecurity. An office dedicated to
biosecurity issues had been established in the Netherlands
(http://www.bureaubiosecurity.nl/en). It is a temporary
national information centre that provides a toolkit to help
determine the level of biosecurity that is needed and pro-
vides information on best practice. This was viewed as an
exemplary and commendable model that should be built
upon across Europe. Laboratory biorisk assessment and the
active processes were considered a difficult facet of biose-
curity in daily practice; help is still needed in this aspect.
Providing quality to the recipients of bioresources was
raised to be fundamentally important; this requires proper
risk assessment and useful standards and regulatory guid-
ance. Access to highly pathogenic bacteria allocated to the
Risk Group 3 was getting more difficult to acquire and not
maintained by many mBRCs. In order to carry out the nec-
essary research on such disease-causing organisms, it was
apparent that the causative organisms will need more
attention in the future. It remains a matter of importance that
research must not be restricted, and it would be counter-
productive. Dual-Use-Research-of-Concern has issues over
scientific research that is intended to be utilised for a bene-
ficial purpose but that can provide knowledge, information,
products or technologies that could be directly misapplied to
pose a significant threat to public health and safety, agri-
cultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment,
materiel or national security. Participants discussed the
balance between publishing science and trying to reduce the
potential of its uptake and misuse. Consensus remains that
the benefits of publication of such research outweigh the
risks, and that suppression of information impedes science
and development. The most recent development on estab-
lishing a new ISO Standard (ISO/TC 212) on the basis of
CWA 15793 on Laboratory biorisk management for labo-
ratories highlighted that a broad dialogue, alliances and
transparency seems highly relevant. MIRRI has the unique
chance and should play an important role in solving the
demand for standardised risk assessment, legal and gov-
ernmental support, alignment of interests and generation of
coherence and harmonisation. Thus, MIRRI developed a
road map to address these demands and intends to establish
an expert cluster, as well as contacts to governments to
promote the establishment of biosecurity offices.
The key elements of the subsequent established MIRRI
policy on Biorisk Management in mBRCs are:
1. Follow the relevant national law and adhere to,
a. the code of conduct on biosecurity for BRCs,
b. other comparable recognised standards,
c. OECD Best Practice Guidelines on biosecurity for
BRCs.
2. Follow the development of biosecurity implementation
strategies and adjust practice accordingly.
3. Work in collaboration with MIRRI and external
partners towards developing and implementing proto-
cols for adequate biosecurity risk assessment of hold-
ings and normative compliance in MIRRI-mBRCs.
4. Offer available specific expertise to the MIRRI biose-
curity expert cluster.
5. Work with national authorities to increase competence
and advocate the establishment of national biosecurity
offices and their international cooperation.
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6. Work in collaboration with MIRRI and external
partners to strengthen the ethical basis for biosecurity
in the scientific community.
7. Adopt existing or develop new educational tools to
raise awareness among mBRC staff.
The MIRRI strategy for the implementation of biose-
curity measures is based on the determination of risk levels
(profiles) as a result of risk assessment and the establish-
ment of an institutional biorisk policy with relevance to
risk prevention. These elements lead to measures in
biosecurity, which need to be implemented via harmonised
procedures and monitored within a continuous improve-
ment process. Comprehensive biorisk management covers
both complementary elements, risk assessment and risk
prevention and governs the required procedures using
standard management system tools. MIRRI encourages the
appointment of a responsible biosecurity officer or biorisk
professional to be in charge of the integration and
improvement of biorisk management and the risk com-
munication with staff and third parties.
Following this scheme, the identified main biosecurity
measures (Fig. 1) are:
1. Physical security of material.
2. Material accountability.
3. Supply and transport of material.
4. Security of data linked to high risk material.
5. Screening of personnel and visitors.
6. Staff training—biosecurity-conscious culture.
7. Incident response plan.
The MIRRI biorisk management system is based on a
management system approach, which enables an mBRC
and other organisations handling biological material to
effectively identify, assess and control the biosafety, bio-
containment and biosecurity risks inherent in its activities.
The biorisk management system is built on the concept of
continual improvement through a cycle of planning,
implementing, reviewing and improving the processes,
measures and policies that an organisation establishes to
meet its goals. The systematic evaluation and correction of
this system leads to improved performance and control of
biorisks.
Conclusions
Biosecurity is a shared responsibility of government, sci-
ence, industry and the community who must all work
together to implement best practices without impeding our
ability to undertake science. Bringing together the stake-
holders of biosecurity issues and establishing a unifying
biosecurity culture as well as compliance understanding,
lays the foundation for the implementation of strategies and
best practices to minimise the risks and dangers that could
arise from any use of pathogenic biological material in any
stage of handling during science or commercial research
and development.
Discussions on the most appropriate risk management
procedures that are feasible in the daily work of a micro-
biologist continue. The organisational background and
managerial capacities of the institutions carrying out such
work must be considered in the choice of best practice to
ensure they are not beyond abilities to implement them.
The governance of risks is a question of organisational
development embedded in a supportive socio-economic
environment; risk management must therefore follow rea-
sonable principles and realistic implementation steps
adjusted to the individual situation. A well-considered
approach has the potential to overcome the reserved atti-
tude of many microbiologists towards engagement in
biorisk management. Ultimately, the goal is a realisable but
nevertheless effective system where one does what one can
with the means available.
The authors strongly believe that scientists wish to
comply with regulatory requirements but primarily wish to
focus on their work in search of discovery. They need to be
supported in this at the institutional, community, national
and international level with clear and practical best practice.
Where possible this needs to be built into routine of the day
to day work as much as possible. They need to be made
aware of the reasons for the implementation of these best
practices. Fundamentally, such practices must be in-built at
the beginning of careers and through educational processes.
Educational and vocational training plays an important role
in processes leading to safe and ethical science.
During its implementation phase MIRRI will define best
practices for the different risk levels, set up harmonised
procedures and establish a network of experts across Eur-
ope supporting mBRCs in their individual implementation
of a biorisk management. The envisaged virtual working
platform MIRRI Coordinated Work Environment (CWE)
will be a beneficial tool for knowledge and information
exchange. Best practice to ensure biosecurity will be a
requirement of mBRCs under the MIRRI partner charter,
and the envisaged expert cluster will provide advice and
where possible, solutions to the problems raised by mBRCs
and microbiologists in general, particularly those raised
during the biosecurity survey. In the meantime microbiol-
ogists in general should make themselves aware of their
responsibility in the prevention of malpractice in the use
and application of microorganisms by utilising the educa-
tional tools available, observing the code of conduct on
biosecurity for Biological Resource Centres and imple-
menting best practice in their work.
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